Obligatory Adjuncts Licensing Definiteness Effect Constructions

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0. Introduction

This chapter addresses the role of adverbials appearing obligatorily in existential constructions in Hungarian (i.e. ‘obligatory adjuncts’). One focus of the discussion will be the grammatical function of such adverbials: while they are generally held to be arguments because of their contribution to event structure, I will argue for their adjunct status. The semantic basis of ‘presentation’ will also be explored in general, with particular attention to the case of adverbials. In what follows, I will use the term ‘presentation’ to mean the introduction of a new and persistent discourse referent, i.e. the pragmatic function of existential constructions.

Examples (1-4) demonstrate the phenomenon; (1) contains a goal, (2) a beneficiary, (3) a source and (4) a purpose adverbial. It is widely held that it is the verbs that prescribe the existential construction in Hungarian but in examples (1-4) the verbs cannot establish an existential construction on their own. This leads to the first question to be answered. Does this mean that adverbials licensing the existential reading trigger a kind of definiteness effect of their own, similar to Hungarian DE-verbs?

(1) Ütöttem egy tojást *(a serpenyőbe)*... és jól megkavartam.
    cracked-I an egg-ACC the pan-into
    ‘I’ve cracked an egg into the pan… and stirred it well.’

(2) Dobtam egy csontot *(a Bodrinak)*... de nem tudta elkapni.
    threw-I a bone-ACC the Bodri-DAT
    ‘I threw a bone to Bodri… but he couldn’t catch it.’

(3) Szakítottam egy virágot *(a bokorról)*... és a hajamba tűztem.
    plucked-I a flower the bush-from
    ‘I plucked a flower from the bush… and stuck it in my hair.’

(4) Hegyeztem egy ceruzát *(a levéliráshoz)*... de eltűnt.
    sharpened-I a pencil-ACC the letter-writing-for
    ‘I sharpened a pencil for the letter-writing… but it disappeared.’

Existential constructions are usually characterized by the definiteness effect, i.e., a non-specificity requirement on the theme argument. A related problem to
be addressed is the case of existential constructions with a definite DP\(^3\), e.g., (5), forming exceptions to the definiteness effect. Such examples are generally considered to be semantically non-productive, representing instances of a purely pragmatic phenomenon. Our second question is whether it is possible to modify the notion of definiteness effect in such a way that it can be extended to these cases, too.

(5) *Vettem azt a kis pőtyös ruhát. Szerinted jól áll nekem?*  
*I bought that little polkadot dress. Do you think it suits me?*

The present proposal is a unified answer to these two questions, suggesting a necessary and sufficient semantic condition of presentation. Namely, the semantic basis of presentation is claimed to be the *instantiation of an intentional entity*. Moreover, it will be argued that instantiation corresponds to the identity relation of natural language, the logical subject of which is an intentional entity (implicit in the sentence), which is identified by its actual instance referred to by the DP (the presented element). This proposal is antilexicalist in not assuming any lexical constraint responsible for the properties of existential constructions encoded in the lexical entry of either the verbs or the determiners or the whole construction. In this framework, the definiteness effect is confined to the semantic condition suggested.

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1, I describe the definiteness effect (henceforth DE) which lies in the point of departure of the phenomena in question and then redefine it on the basis of presentation. The usefulness of the new definition will be proved throughout this chapter. In Section 2, the role of the DP subject to DE, the verb and the adverbial of an existential construction will be discussed on the basis of previous accounts. In Section 3, I outline a model in the terms of which I will phrase the proposal in section 4. Subsections 4.2-4.5 will be dedicated to the components of the proposal. First, the antilexicalist aspect of the proposal, then the possibility of non-specific definites will be discussed. Intentional entities, the heart of my proposal, will be introduced into the semantic model in subsection 4.4. Then, in 4.5, the other main idea the explanation is based on, the view of syntactic arguments as nominal predicates of the thematic arguments of the main verb, will be presented. Section 5 applies the results of previous sections to the case of adverbials licensing presentation. First, in 5.1, the adjunct status of these adverbials will be tested and the insufficiency of aspectual role as a condition of argumenthood will be demonstrated. In 5.2 information structure\(^4\), rather than the close semantic relation of these adverbs to the verb, will be identified as the
source of their obligatoriness. Subsections 5.3 and 5.4 will be dedicated to the semantics and syntax of the adverbials, and in 5.5 further clarification concerning the status of sources and locatives will follow. Section 6 draws the conclusions.

1. Background: Definiteness effect

Definiteness effect, forming the background of this whole chapter, goes back to Milsark’s (1977) observation that English *there*-constructions license some DPs (they were called ‘weak’), while prohibit others (‘strong ones’) – observe:

(6)  
a. There is/are a/some/many mug(s) in the sink.
b. *There is/are the/every/those mug(s) in the sink.

Szabolcsi (1984, 1986) examined the DE-phenomenon in Hungarian and found a large class of verbs, called DE-verbs, the theme argument of which is constrained in the same way as the DPs of *there*-constructions, e.g. (7). Sentences containing such verbs will be called DE-constructions in the case of Hungarian. As a certain class of verbs seems to form DE-constructions while other verbs do not, the accounts of DE in Hungarian are based on the lexical properties of the verb (Szabolcsi 1984, 1986, Maleczki 1995, É. Kiss 1995, Kálmán 1995, Bende-Farkas 1995, Maleczki 2001, Bende-Farkas 2002a, Kálmán and Varasdi 2005, Piñón 2005, 2006a). In contrast, this paper aims at an antilexicalist explanation. (The grammaticality judgments concern the intended DE-construction readings. Examples involving a durative event, e.g., (7b) and (7d), are grammatical with a specific theme under an imperfective reading.)

(7)  
a. Van egy/néhány/sok/ *a /*minden bögre a mosogatóban.
    is a / some / many/the/ every mug the sink-in
    ’There is/are a/some/many/*the/*every mug(s) in the sink.’
b. Épitettem egy/*a házat.
    Built-I a / the house-ACC
    ’I have built a/the house.’
c. Érkezett egy/*a vendég.
    Arrived a / the guest
    ’A/The guest arrived’
d. Hoztam föl Ø/*a bort.
brought-I up $\emptyset$/the wine-ACC
‘I’ve brought up some/the wine’

DE-constructions are characterised as follows:

(8) **DE-construction** (first approximation): DE-constructions are neutral\(^5\), perfective sentences consisting of a DE-verb carrying the main stress of the sentence and a post-specific internal argument (plus the other arguments of the verb, if any, as well as optional adverbials).

Szabolcsi (1983) adopted the notion of post-specificity from Wacha (1978). A post-specific noun phrase, in addition to being non-specific, also introduces a new persistent discourse referent.\(^6\) (The *there*-associate in *there*-constructions also has this property.)

As was already mentioned in the introduction, our basic examples (1-4) behave as DE-constructions in the presence of the adverbials – see (9a), but do not have this reading in the lack of the adverbials – see (9b):

(9) a. Ütöttem egy/*a tojást a serpenyőbe.
    cracked-I an/ the egg-ACC the pan-into
    ‘I’ve cracked an/the egg into the pan.’

b. Ütöttem egy/a tojást.
    cracked-I an/ the egg-ACC
    *‘I’ve cracked an/the egg.’
    ‘I was beating an/the egg.’

A line of explanation that presents itself readily is that verbs can have more than one different subcategorisation frame. The instances occurring in the examples require a goal (1), beneficiary (2), or source (3) argument, and show the definiteness effect, see e.g. (9a), while the verbs without adverbials, (9b), do not and have only imperfective reading. At the same time, it would be hard to construct an account that assigns argument status to the purpose adverbial in (4). In fact, common syntactic tests of argumenthood do not verify the argument status of the other three adverbials either (see 5.2): they all turn out to be adjuncts, although obligatory for the presentational reading. This means that the definition in (8) does not cover these cases. In order to extend the definition, we need to eliminate the implicit assumption that it is the DE-verb that governs the phenomenon:
(10) **DE-construction** (second approximation): DE-constructions are neutral, perfective sentences including a post-specific internal argument.

Deictic presentational sentences\(^7\) containing a definite internal argument, e.g. (5), represent a problem even for this DE definition. These examples are usually excluded from semantic analyses. For example, Keenan (2003) argues that they are not productive, i.e., their sense is not preserved under negation or polar questioning, compare (11) with (5).

(11) a. *Nem vettem azt a kis pöttyős ruhát.*
   ‘I didn’t buy that little polkadot dress.’
   b. *Vettet azt a kis pöttyős ruhát?*
   ‘Did you buy that little polkadot dress?’

Keenan, and purely semantic approaches in general, take the risk of ruling out felicitous sentences like (5) via the radical assumption that strong determiners\(^8\) result in ungrammatical sentences. Barwise and Cooper’s (1981) analysis, also accepted by Szabolcsi (1984), is more moderate in this sense. According to these authors, strong determiners in this construction result in tautologies or contradictions instead of ungrammaticality.\(^9\) My analysis presented in Section 4 will be even more lenient; cases like (5) will not turn out to be tautologies. In this spirit, I extend the definition of DE-constructions to cover the deictic presentational use as well:

(12) **DE-construction** (third approximation): DE-constructions are neutral, perfective sentences including a post-specific, or a definite but presentationally used internal argument.

Some clarification of the terminology is in order here. I use the term *presentation*, which goes back to Hetzron’s (1975) work, for the introduction of a new and persistent discourse referent without any reference to the definiteness or scope of the presented expression. In subsection 4.3, presentation via a DP and the post-specificity of that DP will turn out to be basically the same thing.

Throughout this chapter, I will focus exclusively on presentation through DPs, i.e. DE-constructions, although there is another subclass of presentational constructions presenting the event described by the whole sentence.\(^10\) This latter type will not be discussed here. Furthermore DE-constructions in embedded
contexts will not be looked at here either since the notion of presentation is not defined in embedded contexts.

2. Previous accounts

The schematic representation of English *there*-constructions and Hungarian DE-constructions is shown in (13). Apart from the role of *there*, we can say that these constructions consist of three units: the verb, the determiner phrase and the adverbial represented by a PP. While the obligatoriness of the PP in (13b) is explained by its argumenthood in previous accounts (Bende-Farkas 2002a, Kálmán és Varasdi 2005), I will claim that not all DE-constructions contain a PP.

(13) a. *there* BE DP PP  
   b. V DP (PP)

Accounts of DE differ as to what role they assign to the three units. I look at these in turn below.

2.1 The role of the DP

Previous semantic analyses (among them Milsark 1977, Barwise and Cooper 1981, Keenan 1987, Zucchi 1995, Keenan 2003) address the question of what determiners are available in *there*-constructions. A first step toward an information structural account is Barwise and Cooper’s above mentioned conclusion that strong determiners lead to tautologies instead of ungrammaticality. The second step was taken by Zucchi, who defined the set of strong determiners through the property of presuppositionality, although strong determiners are strictly ungrammatical in his analysis.

Enç (1991) presents a pragmatically motivated account of specificity, although she only mentions *there*-constructions in passing. By acknowledging that an adjective like *following* can influence the specificity of a definite DP, see (14), she admits that, strictly speaking, specificity cannot be an inherent feature of the determiner. Equating strong DPs with specific ones, and at the same time considering specificity as an information structural (rather than truth-conditional) notion corresponds to a pragmatic analysis of the DE.

(14) *There are the following / *above counterexamples to Streck’s theory.*
2.2 The role of the verb

A large class of verbs appearing in Hungarian DE-constructions have particle verb counterparts that can appear in a perfective construction only with a specific internal argument. For approaches aiming to point out a similar contrast in English, see Szabócs (1986), É. Kiss (1998), Piñón (2006b) and Peredy (2007). Hungarian DE literature focuses mainly on the role of the verb and formulates both lexico-semantic and syntactic constrains on DE-verbs. Moreover, noting the information structural aspect of DE-constructions, Piñón (2006a), Kálmán (1995) and Bende-Farkas 2002a explicitly refer to pragmatics in the lexicon. The assumption that DE is a lexical property of the verb faces the following problems:

1. The most important feature, and in my view the biggest problem, of these lexicalist accounts is that the DE-construction in (15c), and the other two constructions containing the same verb form (the imperfective process in (15a) and the perfective particle verb construction in (15b)) are derived from different lexical units.

(15) a. Épül egy/a ház.  
build\textsubscript{unacc} a /the house  
‘A/The house is being built.’

b. Megépült egy/a ház.  
PRT-built\textsubscript{unacc} a /the house  
‘A/The house has been built.’

c. Épült egy/*a ház.  
built\textsubscript{mac} a /the house  
‘A/The house was built.’

A lexical solution is to postulate particular sort shifters that derive one verb type from the other (e.g. Piñón 2005). This is, however, a tenable solution only if the postulation of lexical transformations saves some work for other modules. If, however, the same complexity is required in syntax and pragmatics with or without these lexical rules, then a simpler lexicon is more economical. The accounts mentioned above make both syntactic and semantic assumptions instead of replacing one with the other.

2. A second problem, which Maleczki (2001) draws attention to, is that constructions with DE-verbs are not the only ones that can contain post-specific DPs. She discusses examples like (16), in which the locative adverbial seems to have a crucial role. Her observation supports the replacement of the original DE definition in (8) with that in (10).
(16) Néhány szarvas legelészik a mezőn.
   Some deer graze the meadow-on
   ‘There are some deer grazing in the meadow.’

3. Whereas (15c) does not allow a definite subject under the DE-construction reading, the definite subject is licit in the presence of a focus, see (17). If the lexical entry of DE-verbs prescribed the weak DPs, then one would have to postulate different lexical entries for the verb épül ‘be built’ in the neutral sentence and in the sentence containing the focus-moved constituent, which is highly counterintuitive.

(17) TAVALLY épült a ház.
    last-year built the house.
    ‘It was last year when the house was built.’

2.3 The role of the adverbial

2.3.1 An argument of the verb?

Bende-Farkas (2002a) and Kálmán and Varasdi (2005) address the role of adverbials in DE-constructions. These authors claim that every DE-verb has a “generalised goal argument” (a term coined by Bende-Farkas), which enters into an intimate relationship with the theme as a result of the culmination of the event (in terms of Kálmán and Varasdi). On the basis of this, they would clearly conclude that the adverbials in (1-4) are obligatory because they are arguments of a DE-verb.

Interpreting generalized goals as arguments of the verb is motivated by the intuition that presentation always takes place with some purpose of the speaker. A sign of this is that even if a generalised goal is not present overtly, it can be calculated in the given context. This intuition will be reworked into the notion of intentional entities in the present account. The two accounts mentioned above, however, face the following problems.

1. The final state of the event is established by the interaction of two separate arguments of the verb: the generalised goal and the internal argument, since in these accounts the internal argument is also considered to refer to the final state instead of the actual theme. However, it is undesirable that one thematic relation (the generalised goal) be expressed by two arguments. 2. The final state of telic events is the information focus of perfective sentences. In Hungarian, the structural position of information focus is the
immediately preverbal position carrying the main stress\textsuperscript{13}. In DE-constructions this position is empty; neither one of the two relevant arguments appears there. Bende-Farkas (2002a) fills this position with a covert perfectivity operator, which is the introducer of the final state. Earlier Szabolcsi (1986) also assumed that a phonologically empty associate of the internal argument occupies the preverbal slot. The present proposal, however, instead of assuming covert elements, will argue that neither the adverbial nor the internal argument has the function of referring to the final state, which is why they do not have to occupy the preverbal position.

3. DE-constructions do not necessarily imply the onset of the state described by the adverbial, which indicates that the state they bring into the discourse cannot be an actual final state:

\begin{align*}
(18) & \text{Dobott egy csontot a Bodrinak, de végül a Bundi kapta el.} \\
& \text{threw a bone-ACC the Bodri-to but finally the Bundi caught PRT}
\end{align*}

‘He threw a bone to Bodri but finally it was Bundi who caught it.’

4. Adverbials present in DE-constructions may appear in the perfective particle verb constructions and in the imperfective constructions as well, but they are claimed to be arguments only in DE-constructions. Meanwhile in the other two cases they would probably be analysed as adjuncts. What motivates this distinction?

5. Although the adverbials are obligatory with some verbs, they are optional with others, e.g., with real creation verbs. Bende-Farkas suggests that they can be represented by a domain or world variable in the latter case. The assumption of such variables is an extremely strong tool, in my judgment, and the question remains: what are the restrictions of their use.

2.3.2 A restrictor of the domain of evaluation

Turning to analyses that address the role of the adverbial, called \textit{coda}, in \textit{there}-constructions in English, I will now discuss Zucchi’s (1995) and Keenan’s (2003) accounts briefly. According to Zucchi’s Coda Condition, the coda provides the domain of evaluation of \textit{there}-sentences. This idea was formalised by Keenan. Weak determiners have the following property: for every A and B subset of the domain E: $D(A,B) = D(A \cap B,B)$. For example, the sentence \textit{There are three girls in the garden} is equivalent to \textit{There are three in the garden who are girls in the garden}. This formalisation reflects Zucchi’s intuition in that one
should only consider the girls in the garden in order to judge the truth of the whole sentence, while girls outside the garden do not count.

Accepting this formulation, it becomes clear that the observation that the meaning of the adverbial seems to affect to the meaning of the verb, e.g., in (1-4), does not imply argumenthood but is a consequence of the adverbial restricting the DP argument.

Both authors emphasize that their analysis is valid only on the level of semantics, as the DP and the coda do not form a constituent in syntax. In 5.3 I will propose for Hungarian that these adverbials originate inside the DP: they are DP-adjuncts, that is, semantics still maps to syntax.

3. Model

3.1. Syntax

The pragmatic feature of specificity plays an important role in the studied phenomenon. It is natural to raise the question how to represent specificity in the syntactic analysis. Chomsky’s (1995) inclusiveness condition explicitly claims that only those features can figure in syntactic computations that represent properties of lexical items, or, in the same spirit, Chomsky (2005) maintains that notions of information structure do not figure in the syntactic derivation, at least not in the sense of being formally responsible for movement. Therefore I will not use an information structurally motivated specificity feature in syntax. Instead, I will assume that specificity is entirely determined by structural position. The detailed syntactic framework is beyond the scope of this chapter, but I tentatively adopt a modified version of Diesing’s (1992) Mapping Hypothesis, assuming that non-specificity is the result of existential closure, the domain of which is the VP.

3.2. Semantics

The formal language I will use is conjunctivist. The basic idea of conjunctivism (Pietroski 2005) is that syntactic concatenation (merge) of expressions signifies conjunction of predicates as opposed to the functionist view of Montagovian semantics where concatenation signifies function-application. DRT also exploits this idea (Kamp and Roßdeutscher 1994) but does not operate with existential closures at all. In the conjunctivist model, existential closure converts a predicate into something evaluable as true or
false. To combine this with Diesing’s MH on the one hand and with information structure on the other hand, I will assume that the existential closure of a variable inside VP corresponds to the assertion of its existence (non-specificity) while the closure of the rest (i.e., DPs outside VP) corresponds to existential presuppositions (specificity). Otherwise, the formalism is neo-davidsonian event semantics.14

A further motivation for using this framework is that the conjunctivist representation captures Bach’s (1970) insight according to which parts of speech playing seemingly different roles in the sentence are underlyingly of a uniform nature. Bach claims that noun phrases originate in relative clauses in the deep structure (E.g., The one who is a man is working → The man is working). The idea of treating syntactic argument DPs as nominal predicates of the thematic argument of the verb, which I will exploit in section 4.4, has its roots in Bach’s work, although I will not accept it as a syntactic analysis.

3.3. Discourse representation

For the study of the semantic/pragmatic interface one also needs a discourse model. The present proposal will capture the presentational function by incorporating an identity relation holding between an implicit thematic argument and the discourse referent of a DP; hence a model that keeps thematic arguments of predicates distinct from discourse referents introduced by DPs is needed. Farkas and de Swart (2003) propose such a model in the DRT framework. I will adopt their basic ideas without adopting the DRT formalism here. In their model, semantic predicates introduce their thematic arguments into the discourse, while determiners and pronouns introduce discourse referents. They define a rule by which discourse referents replace thematic arguments in the course of constructing the meaning of the sentence, and another rule called unification, which replaces the relevant thematic argument of a predicate by the thematic argument of another predicate. E.g. in the case of incorporation, which is the focus of their interest: vendég érkezik ‘guest arrive’ → guest(x) & arrive(y) and due to unification x = y.

The following example demonstrates how to derive the semantic representation of a sentence using thematic arguments (x, y, ...), discourse referents (u, v, ...) and the conjunctivist description. Determiners and pronouns correspond to some predicate $p_u(x)$. $p_u(x) = 1$ iff the discourse referent $u$ introduced by the corresponding determiner or pronoun replaces the thematic argument $x$. The formulas serve demonstrative purposes, a strict formal analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter.
4. The proposal and its components

4.1 The semantic condition of presentation and the role of adverbials

A construction presents a discourse referent represented by a determiner iff it establishes an instantiation relation between the actual thematic argument of the DP and an intentional thematic argument of some predicate of the sentence.

The discourse referent introduced by the DP is interpreted as post-specific.

Obligatory adjuncts in DE-constructions: An adverbial adjunct is obligatory in a DE-construction iff the DP instantiates the intentional argument of the adverbial.

The following subsections will discuss the components of the proposal, while Section 5 summarizes the consequences with respect to obligatory adjuncts.

4.2 The antilexicalist view of the definiteness effect

This proposal is an antilexicalist one in not holding any lexical requirement responsible for presentation (and definiteness effect). The present approach attempts to avoid the problems mentioned in Section 2 by making the following assumptions:

- there is no reference to information structure in the lexical entries,
- verbs licensing DE-constructions, as well as those appearing in the perfective particle verb construction and the imperfective construction constitute one and the same lexical entry,
• state adverbials may also license DE-constructions,
• the definiteness effect is confined to pragmatic effects plus the semantic condition suggested,
• no special syntactic constraint is postulated.

The two major arguments against the lexicalist view are discussed and reflected upon below.

4.2.1 Definiteness effect: requirement or licensing of post-specific arguments?

In this subsection, I argue for considering DE as the licensing, rather than the requirement, of weak DPs. I show that the requirement view simply does not work without hypothesizing that the lexical entry of the verb of the DE-construction is different from the other uses of the same verb. As was already mentioned, the present proposal returns to the null hypothesis, i.e., postulates only one lexical entry. This assumption leads to the following interpretation of the data below. Durative events, either expressing an activity as in (a), a change of state process as in (b) or a creation (i.e., coming into existence or becoming available) as in (c), have an imperfective reading when the argument is specific – see the (i) examples in (22a-c). This reading is not available in the case of non-durative events – see the (i) examples in (23a-c). (The reason why they are sometimes marked with question marks instead of stars is the possibility of a coerced imperfective.) The DE-construction is generally unavailable – as shown by the (ii) examples, but there are some events that license a weak internal argument, see the (c) examples. Finally, although not demonstrated below, all event types can be perfectivized by an appropriate verbal particle: gurul ‘roll’ → el-gurul ‘PRT-roll’, pirul ‘become-red’ → meg-pirul ‘PRT-become-red’, etc.

(22) durative events: strong DP weak DP
rolls the ball rolled a ball
‘The ball is rolling.’ ‘A ball rolled.’
b. change i. Pirul a hús.
browns the meat browned a meat
‘The meat is browning.’ ‘A meat browned.’
c. creation: i. Épül a ház.
buildsunacc the house ii. Épült egy ház.
‘The house is being built.’ ‘The house was built.’

(23) non-durative events: strong DP weak DP
   bounces the ball  
   ‘The ball is bouncing.’  
ii. *Pattant egy labda.  
   bounced a ball  
   ‘A ball bounced.’  
b. change i. *Törik a váza.  
   break the vase  
   ‘The vase is breaking.’  
ii. *Törtem egy vázát.  
   broke a vase  
   ‘A vase broke.’  
c. creation: i. *Érkezik a vendég.  
   arrives the guest  
   ‘The guest is arriving.’  
ii. Érkezett egy vendég.  
   arrived a guest  
   ‘A guest arrived.’

In sum, in the framework postulating just one lexical entry, some verbs are special in licensing the non-specific internal argument. In the case of the obligatory adverbials in DE-constructions (1-4), it is even more obvious that they can form grammatical sentences with strong DPs as well (resulting in an imperfective reading), so they do not require, just license the weak DPs and, through this, the DE-constructions, e.g., (24).

(24) a. Öntöm a vizet a serpenyőbe.  
   pour-I the water-ACC the pan-into  
   ‘I was pouring the water into the pan.’  
b. Öntöttem valamennyi vizet a serpenyőbe.  
   poured-I some water-ACC the pan-into  
   ‘I poured some water into the pan.’

4.2.2 The internal argument plus verb complex

In this subsection I point out that verbs licensing a post-specific internal argument do not constitute a verb class since the licensing of post-specificity depends not only on the verb but on the verb + argument pair. Although both tol ‘push’ and tör ‘break’ are unacceptable as DE-constructions in (25), they become fully acceptable, (26), (although somewhat substandard in (26a)) if the theme argument is changed.

   pushed-I a cart-ACC  
   ‘I pushed a cart.’  
b. *Törtem egy vázát.  
   broke-I a vase-ACC  
   ‘I broke a vase.’
(26) a. Toltam egy sms-t.  
   pushed-I an sms-ACC  
   ‘I sent an sms.’  
b. Törtem egy darab kenyeret.  
   broke-I a piece bread-ACC  
   ‘I broke a piece of bread.’
In defence of the lexicalist view, one could say that the lexical transformation that yields DE-verbs also changes the selectional criteria of the verb; but, no doubt, in entirely unpredictable ways. The other possibility, which I am advocating, is contextual licensing. That is, the syntax and semantics of DE-constructions do not exclude any verb; it is merely the felicity judgement that varies from one verb plus argument pair to the other according to the world knowledge of the speaker and the addressee. If the event expressed by a certain pair can be conceptualized as one making available the theme argument, then the sentence is felicitous. Actually, even _toltam egy talicskát_ ‘I pushed a cart’ may serve as a DE-construction in a context where the pushing of the cart is the final phase of the production of a cart.

Further evidence for this view is provided by the fact that even activity verbs like _olvas_ ‘read’ or _játszik_ ‘play’, and statives like _lát_ ‘see’ or _hall_ ‘hear’ constitute DE-constructions.

(22) durative events: strong DP weak DP
a’. activity: i. _Olvassa a könyvet._ ii. _Olvasott egy könyvet._
   read-I the book-ACC read a book-ACC
   ‘She is reading the book.’ ‘He read a book.’

a”. stative: i. _Látja a vulkánt._ ii. _Látott egy vulkánt._
   sees the volcano-ACC saw a volcano-ACC
   ‘He sees the volcano.’ ‘She saw a volcano.’

4.3 Specificity and definiteness

The presented entity, as was said earlier, has to be discourse new. Whatever is discourse new is non-specific according to Enç (1991). But the deictic type of presentational sentences contains (usually deictic) definite, i.e., specific, expressions, see (5). This apparent contradiction can be resolved using accurate definitions. According to Enç, both definiteness and specificity require that their discourse referents be linked to previously established discourse referents. What distinguishes the two is the type of linking. For definite DPs the relevant linking relation is identity, while for specific DPs it is inclusion. I agree with the types of links but suggest a slight modification, following Lambrecht (1994), in distinguishing the text internal and text external world, as regards the domain of linking.
Specificity: A DP is specific iff its discourse referent is (assumed to be) linked to a previous discourse referent (i.e. linked discourse internally) by the inclusion relation.

Definiteness: A DP is definite iff its discourse referent is (assumed to be) linked either to a previous discourse referent (i.e. discourse internally) or directly to a discourse external entity (via deixis or unique identification) by the identity relation.

Deictic reference (this/that horse) or reference to a known but previously unmentioned entity (the horse) establishes definite, but non-specific, i.e., discourse internally non-linked reference. Making the precise distinction between discourse-internal and -external worlds available to the speech participants has the consequence that the definite DPs of deictic constructions, which are non-specific in this modified sense, count as post-specific. That is, the DE-definitions in (10) and (12) have turned out to be equivalent.

4.4 Intentional entities

I claim that the internal argument of the DE-construction in (15c) differs ontologically from that of the other two variants (the perfective particle verb construction (15b) and the imperfective construction (15a)), in addition to the information structural difference attested (the post-specificity of the former one and the specificity of the latter ones). The ontological difference is that the entity referred to by the internal argument of the DE-construction is an actual entity, while the one referred to in the other two constructions is not the object itself but rather its plan.

Parsons (1990: 172-180) argues against the ontological difference saying that even if the imperfective sentence I am writing the article does not imply that the article will be finished once, the part of the article already written is an actual object and can be referred to by the expression the article. Parsons calls these kinds of objects unfinished objects. Parson is undoubtedly right in saying that some kind of an object already exists during the writing process, and he may also be right in claiming that this object can be referred to by the same noun phrase as the intended finished object would be. But this does not necessarily mean that the entity referred to in the imperfective variant or the perfective particle verb construction is indeed this unfinished object.

I suggest that it is usually possible to interpret the theme of the verb as referring to an unfinished object, while it is also possible to interpret it as
referring to something other than an actual entity, namely, an intended entity. The former case represents a change-of-state event, the latter case a creation (or ‘becoming available’) event. In the discussions below, I will focus on this “creative” interpretation of verbs. Therefore, I will assume that the referential expressions of natural languages may refer to abstract counterparts of the actual objects of the real world: the plan, the intention or the possibility of their existence. I will use the notion of intentional entities as opposed to actual entities without going into details here concerning their philosophical relevance.

4.4.1 Kálmán and Varasdi (2005): specificity based on intentionality

Kálmán and Varasdi (2005) revive Brentano’s (1995) concept of intentional entities in connection with the particle verb and the imperfective forms of Hungarian DE-verbs. They say, following the Kripkean (1959) formulation, that “a process is associated with an intentional object iff all its culminations fall into the partition of possible worlds in which the entity in question actually exists”. The primary goal of their work is to modify the notion of specificity in such a way as to cover all the contexts in which a particle plus DE-verb can be used. As mentioned above, the specificity requirement of particle verbs (É. Kiss 1995, Kálmán 1995), as opposed to the post-specificity requirement of DE-constructions, is widely held, although there are examples like (28) where the object of the particle verb lacks an antecedent set which it could be a member of, furthermore it is not clear what is the entity the object refers to:

(28) *Kírúgtak, mert nem írtam meg egy szerződést.
   ‘They fired me because I didn’t write a contract’
   ‘They fired me because I wrote no contract’
   (Kálmán and Varasdi’s example (4))

Therefore, Kálmán and Varasdi suggest the following definition for specificity: “a reference to an entity is specific iff it presupposes […] the existence of an intentional entity the actualization of which could be the entity in question”.

The advantage of their approach, in my view, is that it ties together two observations: (post-)specificity effects and the effect of intentionality. A serious disadvantage, however, lies in the fact that, in contrast to the verb megír ‘PRT-write’, its negated counterpart nem ir meg ‘not write PRT’ turns out to behave as an intensional verb, with its internal argument referring to an entity outside the actual world, namely, to an instantiation of the intentional entity in a
possible world where the event \textit{megír} ‘PRT-write’ would culminate. A situation in which the verb and its negated version have different intensional properties is not what we want to obtain.

My solution to this problem is to define intentional entities independently of possible worlds. I postulate the set of intentional entities as a subset of the universe of the extensional model. This subset and the subset of actual entities are disjoint and their union constitutes the universe. In this respect, I follow Piñón (2005, 2008), who extends the universe of the traditional semantic analysis of verbs of creation with templates. I do not adopt the details of his analysis, however, which exploits the notion of “incremental” and “created” thematic relations (in the spirit of Krifka 1992).

Summing up, the present proposal builds intentional entities into the semantic representation in the following way. Verbs may have either an actual or an intentional theme. In the first case, they describe a change of state, and the internal argument refers to the actual object either finished or unfinished, depending on the aspect of the sentence. This is the case of affected objects. In the second case, which contains effected objects, we speak about creation in a narrower sense: a process aiming at the instantiation of an intentional entity takes place (and maybe culminates) in the actual world. The internal argument refers to this intentional entity in the imperfective and the particle verb constructions. DE-constructions are established when (i) the theme is an intentional entity but (ii) the internal argument refers to the actual entity which is its instantiation. Before going into this issue in detail, a brief clarification of the difference between intensional and intentional contexts is in order here.

4.4.2. Intensionality versus intentionality

At first glance, intensional verbs seem to be DE-verbs, cf. (29a). However, an important difference is that in the usual DE-constructions the existence of the referent of the object follows, while in intensional cases it does not.

Following Larson (2001), I tentatively assume that intensional verbs have clausal complements (the bracketed part of sentence (29a)), which refer to propositions. These propositions embed the entity referred to by the object. The fact that the DPs do not introduce persistent discourse referents is a consequence of their embeddedness. In contrast real DE-verbs have an entity argument.\textsuperscript{18}

(29)  a. \textit{Ígértem} [\textsc{sc egy/*a kiskutyát} Marinak].
    promised-I a/ the puppy-ACC Mary-to
4.4.3 Arguments for the actual/intentional distinction

1. The verb plus object pairs in example (30) demonstrate that one and the same event represented by one and the same verb may be expressed either by reference to the actual object, which is the affected theme of the event – see the first examples, or by reference to the intentional entity – see the second examples.

(30) veri a tojást / a habot ‘whip the egg / the cream’; Őrli a búzát / a lisztet ‘grind the wheat / the meal’; Fúrja a falat / a lyukat ‘drill the wall / the hole’; Olvasztja a jeget / a vizet ‘melt the ice / the water’; Kavarja a levest / a tészttét ‘stir the soup / dough’

2. I will use deictic expressions in order to refer to discourse external actual objects (az a buli ‘that party’), and DPs modified by the adjective tervezett ‘planned’ to refer to plans (a tervezett buli ‘the planned party’). Whereas the DE construction in (31c) is only felicitous with the actual az a buli, the particle verb construction in (31b) and the imperfective in (31a) are felicitous with a tervezett buli, denoting the intentional object.

(31) a. Szervezem *azt a bulit / a tervezett bulit.
organise-I this-ACC the party / the planned party-ACC
‘I am organising this / the planned party.’

b. Megszervezem azt a bulit / a tervezett bulit.
PRT-organised-I this-ACC the party / the planned party-ACC
‘I organised this / the planned party.’

c. Szervezem azt a bulit / *a tervezett bulit, emlékszel.
organised-I that-ACC the party / the planned party-ACC
‘I organised that / the planned party, do you remember.’

The issue of how the theme argument of the verb can be different from the thematic argument of the DP in DE-constructions, namely, the former one is an intentional, while the latter one is an actual entity, will be addressed in the next section.
4.5 Instantiation and identity

4.5.1 Noun phrases as nominal predicates

Inspired by Bach’s idea mentioned in 3.2, I now address the following question: In what sense can the syntactic argument DP correspond to a relative clause? The conjunctivist representation of the \( D + NP + \text{case marking} \) concatenate signifies the following conjunct: \( p_u(x_1) \land \text{noun}(x_1) \land \Theta(e, x_2) \). In the course of constructing the meaning of the sentence, the question is how the first two conjuncts characterize the thematic argument \( x_2 \) of the verb. I claim that they correspond to the four types of nominal statements. According to Higgins’s (1973) fourfold categorization, there exist predicative, identificational, specificational and identity statements. Example (32) shows that there are exactly four ways in which a verb can combine with its theme argument. According to what was said above, the DE-construction in (32d) is available only in the case of creative events (i.e., when the verb combines with an intentional theme), hence the theme argument of the verb is assumed to be intentional in all the four cases. \( \hat{x} \) stands for variables representing intentional entities as opposed to actual ones. The formulas only show the conjuncts contributed by the object DP. Example (32a) is the case of incorporation studied by Farkas and de Swart; the unification of the bare arguments \( \text{unif}(\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, ) \) corresponds to the predicational statement (33a) without a discourse referent. Example (32b) is the ordinary case; the theme argument is unified with an argument related to a discourse referent \( \text{unif}(\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, ) \land p_u(\hat{x}_2) \); this corresponds to the identificational statement (33b). Example (32c) is the case of exhaustive focus, which has been identified as a specificational statement by É. Kiss (2006d), cf. (33c). In this case not only the thematic arguments but also the two discourse referents are unified \( \text{unif}(\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, ) \land p_u(\hat{x}_1) \land p_u(\hat{x}_2) \rightarrow u=v \); the presence of \( v \) is due to the presupposition of specificational statements. And finally, the DE-construction (32d) and the identity statement (33d) remain. It is natural to raise the question whether they are related.

John house-ACC build.  John build the house-ACC
‘John is building a house.’  ‘John is building the house.’
\[ ...\text{house}(\hat{x}_1) \land \Theta_{TI}(e, \hat{x}_2) \land p_u(\hat{x}_1) \land \text{house}(\hat{x}_1) \land \Theta_{TI}(e, \hat{x}_2) \]

John the house-ACC build.  John build a house-ACC

‘It’s the house that John is building.’ ‘John will build a house.’

...\( p_i(\hat{x}_1) \& \text{house}(\hat{x}_1) \& \Theta_{\text{H}}(e, \hat{x}_2) \) ...\( p_i(x_1) \& \text{house}(x_1) \& \Theta_{\text{H}}(e, \hat{x}_2) \)

(33)  a. predicational  
- Amit Tádé épít, az [ház]
- which T build that house

‘What Tádé is building is a house.’

b. identificational  
- Ez, amit Tádé épít, [a ház].
- this which T build the house

‘This (object), which Tádé is building, is the house.’

c. specificational  
- Az [a házat], amit Tádé épít.
- that the house which T build

‘That is the house that Tádé is building.’

d. identity  
- Amit Tádé épít, az [egy ház].
- which T build that house

‘What Tádé is building is a house.’

4.5.2 The identity relation of natural language corresponds to instantiation

Assuming that the translation of the natural language predicate \textit{identical} into the formal language is a two-argument relation and both arguments are entities, in a sentence like \( DP_1 \text{ is identical to } DP_2 \) the co-reference of \( DP_1 \) and \( DP_2 \) would violate Condition C. Hence, the referents of the DPs have to be different entities. At the same time, this sentence forms a contingent statement instead of being a contradiction asserting the identity of two different entities. My proposal is that pairs consisting of an intentional entity and its instantiation are good candidates for fulfilling the \textit{identical}(x,y) relation of natural language. They are ontologically not identical but near enough to be equated given the imprecision of natural languages. Obviously, the translation of the natural language predicate \textit{identical}(x,y) into a formal language will differ from logical identity; it will be what I have referred to as instantiation. The idea of the previous subsection that the four possible ways of argument realisation in (32) correspond to the four types of nominal predicates is completed by the claim that the post-specific arguments of DE-constructions are realized via identity statements. In the next subsection 4.5.3, I demonstrate the connection between identity and post-specificity.
4.5.3 The connection between identity statements and post-specificity

The difference between (33a) and (33d) or between (34a) and (35a) is considered to be an irrelevant optional variation not discussed in the literature. Nominal predicates with or without the indefinite article are equally treated as predicational. The idea that the indefinite DP is a property denoting expression appears in a number of places in the DE-literature (see McNally 1998, and for Hungarian Bende-Farkas 2002a, Piñón 2006a and Kálmán and Varasdi 2005). Example (35), however, demonstrates the discourse-referent-introducing property of the indefinite DP predicate as opposed to the bare NP predicate in (34). (34b) is an infelicitous continuation of (34a) as the bare NP őrült ‘mad’ does not introduce a discourse referent referring to the husband. In contrast, after the sentence in (35a), the same sentence is acceptable. 

(34)  
a. A férjem őrült.  
   'My husband is mad.'  
b. #Ez az őrült megszökött a kórházból.  
   'This mad guy ran away from the hospital.'

(35)  
a. A férjem egy őrült.  
   'My husband is a mad guy.'  
b. Ez az őrült megszökött a kórházból.

4.6 Summary

The aim of this section was to present the individual components of my proposal (specificity, intentionality, noun phrases as nominal predicates, instantiation as identity) and motivate their use. The conclusion of this section is that the identity relation of natural language corresponds to the instantiation relation of the language of logic. In the proposed discourse model, instantiation equals the unification of an intentional and an actual thematic argument. A DP is post-specific iff the discourse referent it introduces refers to an actual entity that is identified with an intentional one in the sentence. In the examples of this section, the intentional entity was the theme argument of the verb. Let’s now turn to DE-constructions with obligatory adjuncts.

5. The Case of Obligatory Adjuncts
5.1 Arguments for the adjunct status of beneficiaries, sources and goals

The classic division between arguments and adjuncts, causing problems in a number of languages, is rather problematic in Hungarian as well. Various alternatives have been suggested in the literature. Kálmán (2006) argues for a continuous scale the two extremes of which are these two notions. Rákosi (2006) does not question the linguistic relevance of discrete categories but, in addition to arguments and adjuncts, he assumes a third category of thematic adjuncts. Gábor and Héja (2006) maintain the argument/adjunct distinction but are radical in claiming that iff the morphological case marking of a constituent determines the thematic role of that constituent for a whole predicate class than the constituent is an adjunct.

In the generative framework, a purely structural distinction is at hand: arguments originate in a complement or specifier position of the layered VP, while adjuncts are adjoined. However, Larson (1988) argues that postverbal adverbials are positioned inside the VP independently of their argument status. Thus the semantic distinction of arguments and adjuncts does not necessarily map to syntax.\(^{22}\)

What I am going to focus on in this section is the relevance of aspectual information to determining argument status. Tenny (1994), among others, claims that playing an aspectual role is a sufficient condition of being an argument. Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2001) introduce a correspondence between subevents and arguments in syntax, claiming that there must be at least one argument XP per subevent in event structure. In contrast to this view, Reinhart’s (2002) theta theory does not refer to aspectual information at all. The next subsection will demonstrate that constituents with an event structural role do not necessarily qualify for argument status in other traditional tests.\(^{23}\) The tests are based on semantic, morphological and syntactic properties. The general question of the status of aspectual arguments is of course far beyond the scope of this chapter; in what follows I intend to raise the possibility of a more restricted notion of argumenthood as usual, and show that this notion, as well as such obvious argument tests like semantic selection, result in the adjunct status of adverbials licensing DE-constructions. I do not claim any of the tests to represent the right defining property of argumenthood, my purpose is only to demonstrate that in many respects the adverbials under scrutiny here do not seem to form a natural class with the most typical arguments (agents, themes, etc). Finally, I conclude in 5.2 that obligatoriness as a cardinal test of argumenthood is ruled out.
Let us start with looking at the behavior of (a) goal, (b) beneficiary, (c) source and, as a reference point, (d) purpose phrases under some traditional argument tests.

Test 1: Semantic selection. The theme of the verb *eat*, for example, is an argument since there is a requirement that it has to refer to an edible object: *John ate an apple* vs. *John ate a table*. The examined adverbials are not selected; on the contrary, their thematic role can vary. E.g. in (36b) the beneficiary can be replaced a goal (more precisely, orientation of trajectory).

(36) a. Útöttem egy tojást a serpenyőbe / Lenke fejére.
   cracked-I an egg-ACC the pan-into Lenke head-her-onto
   ‘I’ve cracked an egg into the pan / onto Lenke’s head.’

b. Dobtam egy csontot a Bodrinak / a bokor felé.
   threw-I a bone-ACC the Bodri-DAT the bush-towards
   ‘I threw a bone to Bodri / towards the bush.’

c. Szakítottam egy virágot a bokorról / az asztaldíszről.
   plucked-I a flower the bush-from the centerpiece-from
   ‘I plucked a flower from the bush / from the centerpiece.’

d. Hegyeztem egy ceruzát a levélíráshoz / a szurkáláshoz.
   sharpened-I a pencil-ACC the letter-writing-for the prickling-for
   ‘I sharpened a pencil for the letter-writing / for the prickling.’

Test 2: Compositionality. According to Komlósy (1994), a traditional distinction between arguments and adjuncts is the following. In the case of adjuncts, their semantic contribution to the meaning of the sentence can be calculated from their morphological components. In contrast, the thematic role of an argument cannot be determined without the predicate that it is an argument of. E.g.: *Pálban* means ‘in Paul’. *Pálban* is an adjunct in *Felszívódik az alkohol Pálban* ‘Alcohol is absorbed in Paul’ but an argument in *Péter megbízik Pálban* ‘Peter relies on Paul’. According to Zaenen and Maling (1984), Svenonius (2002), Woolford (2006) and others, in addition to the division between structural and non-structural Case, Case theory must distinguish two kinds of non-structural Cases: lexical Case and thematic Case. Adopting this classification, Komlósy’s test can be reformulated as refuting the existence of thematically case marked arguments. According to this test, all the four types of adverbials in question prove to be adjuncts as their morphological case marking refers to their thematic roles.

Test 3: Iterability. Adjuncts are iterable. This test is not decisive for beneficiaries – see (37b), while the other three types of adverbials test as
adjuncts. Notice that both test 2 and test 3 show the locative of live-type verbs to be adjuncts: *He lives in Budapest in a two bedroom flat near the Danube.*

(37) a. Ütöttem egy tojást a serpenyőbe a rántottába
   cracked-I an egg-ACC the pan-into the scrambled-eggs-into
   ‘I’ve cracked an egg into the pan into the scrambled eggs.’

b. *Dobtam egy csontot a kutyáknak a Bodrínak.
   threw-I a bone-ACC the dogs-DAT the Bodri-DAT
   ‘I threw a bone to the dogs to Bodri’

c. Szakítottam egy virágot a bokorról a levelek alól.
   plucked-I a flower the bush-from the leafs from-beneath
   ‘I plucked a flower from the bush from beneath the leafs.’

d. Hegyeztem egy ceruzát a levéliráshoz délutánra.
   sharpened-I a pencil-ACC the letter-writing-for afternoon-for
   ‘I sharpened a pencil for the letter-writing for the afternoon.’

Test 4: Syntactic extraction. The argument or adjunct status of a constituent can be ascertained by whether it is an island for extraction. The complements of an argument can be extracted – (38a), in contrast to those of adjuncts – (38b). However, in Hungarian extraposition from a noun phrase bearing a non-structural case is obligatory (cf. É. Kiss 2002:178), so this test is inapplicable.

(38) a. Kivel i unod [a levelezést t jel].
   with-who detest-you the correspondence
   ‘With whom do you detest the correspondence?’

b. *Kivel i hegyeztél egy ceruzát [a levelezéshez t jel].
   who-with sharpened-you a pencil-ACC the correspondence-for
   ‘With whom did you sharpen a pencil for the correspondence?’

On the basis of the tests above, we can conclude that the four types of adverbials under scrutiny are adjuncts. The odd one out is the beneficiary, its non-iterability makes it similar to arguments, but since iterability is not a necessary but only a sufficient condition of adjuncthood, it is not a real counterexample. I also remind the reader of point 3 of my critique of the ‘generalized goal argument’ analysis in 2.3.1: the fact that the state represented by the beneficiary is not necessarily implied by the sentence (cf. (18)) is a strong argument against analysing beneficiaries as generalized goals.

A further basic difference between ‘traditional’ arguments and our adverbials is the following. The argumenthood of a participant of the event can be represented by a two-argument semantic relation: $\Theta(e, x)$, where $e$ refers to
the event variable and $x$ to some entity. The adverbials represent states, thus they are called state adverbials. But the relation of the event and these states cannot be exhaustively represented by the above two-argument relation since these states are also related to the theme argument, namely, they describe some state of the theme. Maintaining that morphological case suffixes realise two-argument thematic relations, the following distinction has to be made. If a DP refers to a participant of the event then the case marking on the DP corresponds to a relation between the event and the participant entity, e.g., *Katit*'Kate-ACC’ → $\Theta(e, Kati)$, while if a PP or a case-marked DP stands for a state adverbial, then the case marking corresponds to a relation between the theme argument and an entity, e.g. *Katinak* ‘Kate-DAT’ → $BEN(x_{th}, Kati)$.

The conclusion is that arguments and the four types of adverbials in question do not constitute a natural class if either aspeecual role, or the traditional criteria of selection and iterability are postulated as the definitive property of argumenthood.

5.2 The obligatoriness of adverbial adjuncts in DE-constructions

The obligatoriness of a constituent is a traditional diagnostic for argumenthood. But in 5.1 we have already seen that the obligatory adverbials licensing DE-constructions have turned out to be adjuncts on the basis of several other diagnostics. Hence the counterexample of adjuncts of DE-constructions rules out obligatoriness from among argument tests.

The presence of these obligatory adjuncts is not prescribed by the verb but is required by the information organisation of the sentence. They provide the implicit intentional entity that is essential for obtaining the post-specific reading. If a verb can be interpreted as having an intentional theme, the very same adverbials that are obligatory with other verbs are optional with it. The postulation of argument status for these adverbials would result in unclear conditions concerning their omittability.

Subsection 5.3 is dedicated to the semantics, and 5.4 to the syntax of these adverbials. 5.5. examines sources and locatives.

5.3 Semantic analysis

Previous accounts of DE in Hungarian (subsection 2.2) and the present analysis converge on the claim that the obligatory adverbials of DE-constructions are, semantically, predicated of the theme.
As the universe of our model contains intentional entities, there must also be state adverbials predicating of them. The argument of the state adverbial has to be unified, as usual, with the thematic argument of the noun of the corresponding syntactic argument. If the former entity is an intentional one while the latter is an actual one, then the unification means instantiation, and results in post-specific interpretation, i.e. the sentence is a DE-construction.

If a state adverbial predicating of an intentional entity is present, even verbs the theme argument of which cannot be interpreted as an intentional entity may occur in DE-constructions. That is why *dob egy csontot* ‘throw a bone’ or *üit egy tojást* ‘crack an egg’ may appear in a DE-construction, e.g., in (39b), although they could not establish a DE-construction on their own, see (39a). In the presence of the adverbial, the unification of an intentional and an actual entity is possible and establishes the identity relation.

(39)  a. *Dobtam egy csontot.*  
     threw-I-(NOM) a bone-ACC  
     ∃e∃x∃y [throw(e) & p_e(x) & Θ_AG(e,x) & p_y(y) & bone(y) & Θ_TH(e,y)]  
     → no intentional entity → no presentational reading  
     b. Dobtam egy csontot a Bodrinak.  
     threw-I-(NOM) a bone-ACC the Bodri-DAT  
     ∃e∃x∃y [throw(e) & p_e(x) & Θ_AG(e,x) & p_y(y) & bone(y) & Θ_TH(e,y) &…  
     …& p_m(z) & Θ_BEM( y,z)]  
     → unif( y,y) → presentational reading

5.4 Syntactic analysis

I tentatively assume that all state adverbials originate inside an argument DP as adjuncts. That is, state adverbials, among them the obligatory adverbials discussed in this chapter, are surface adjuncts originating inside the DP of their logical subject.

Another possible analysis of state adverbials is that they are predicates of a small clause. The small clause has to be either a complement of the main verb or an adjunct. In the former case (see den Dikken 2006), the verb has to take a propositional argument, since small clauses represent semantic propositions, e.g., *threw [SC a bone to the dog]*. This line of analysis is also attractive as it reflects the spirit of my account, namely that the argument of the verb is not simply an actual entity but something which is able to encode purposes, plans and intentions underlying the phenomenon of presentation. Assuming an adjunct SC with a
controlled PRO subject is also possible. Choosing between the two analyses is left for further research.

5.5 Adverbial types

5.5.1 Sources

The present analysis claims that state adverbials, and sources as well, originate in the theme DP, that is below the PredP projection. Surányi, in contrast, argues in Chapter 3 for the hierarchy in (40), i.e., sources are base generated in the sentence structure higher than the so-called ‘verb-modifier’ (VM) position (i.e., Spec, PredP), on the basis of the fact that no source particles are attested in the VM, e.g., *belőlevesz a tálból ‘from.it(=PRT)-take the bowl-from’ in contrast to goal particles, e.g., beletesz a tálba ‘into.it(=PRT)-put the bowl-into’. However, since full source DPs/NPs may appear in VM, namely, in the so-called stress avoiding constructions (Komlósy 1989), e.g. valamiből\textsubscript {VM} áll / készül ‘be made of / consist of’, valahonnan\textsubscript {VM} van/származik ‘be from’, one is still obliged to accept an analysis where sources are base generated below the VM.

(40) […]Temp/Sub_JAgentive/Sub_JExperiencer/Source/OOT/Stat_External…[VM… […]Stat_Internal/Route/Goal/Theme/Oblique…]]

Although the study of dependencies between temporal and information structure does not pertain to the main concerns of this paper, I think that the universally attested source/goal asymmetries have their roots in this dependency. That is, I basically agree with É. Kiss’s (2002) account, challenged by Surányi (this volume), that the asymmetry is due to the role of VM elements in determining viewpoint aspect. My explanation in a nutshell is the following. The VM position represents the main assertion of the sentence. In a case when a goal expression is in VM, the persistence of the goal state implies the preceding event leading to that state but the persistence of a preliminary state expressed as a source does not imply the existence of an ensuing event. That is why sources in the VM position are odd. But this also explains why they can still appear in stative sentences (e.g., in the above mentioned stress avoiding constructions) or, in fact, in eventive sentences if it is indeed only the source state that is relevant, e.g. (41).

(41) A: Milyen idő van a Balatonnál?
5.5.2 Locatives

Locative states overlap with the main event hence, in accordance with the temporal reasoning above, they imply the persistence of the parallel event. It follows that locatives and locative particles may appear in VM, which is predicted by Surányi’s hierarchy as well (cf. the lower stative internal locative position). Locatives have been excluded from my analysis so far since their adjunct status is usually not a matter of debate. However, Maleczki’s example in (17) was mentioned on a par with the other adverbials which license DE-constructions. The present analysis can be extended to locatives without any difficulty. That is, a locative adverbial may also have an intentional argument, and this can be instantiated by an actual argument DP.

Locative DE-constructions are different from the others as the new discourse referent can be introduced by the external argument of an atelic event as well – see (17).

6. Conclusion

In this chapter, the status of adverbials appearing obligatorily in DE-constructions was explored. DE-constructions were defined in general as those in which the internal argument is post-specific. (Post-specificity means non-specificity (unavailability in the discourse past) and the introduction of a new discourse referent (availability in the ensuing discourse).) This broader definition has two advantages. (i) The marked cases of definites appearing in DE-constructions and (ii) the constructions in which it is clearly the adverbial that licenses the post-specific interpretation can also be covered by the analysis. The former becomes possible by establishing the category of non-specific definites on the basis of the slightly modified notions of specificity and definiteness. The latter becomes possible in an antilexicalist approach where the DE phenomenon is not the result of lexical properties or selectional criteria of certain lexical entries (e.g. the main verbs).

The semantic claim is that the referent of the post-specific DP is the instantiation of an intentional entity. The logical relation of instantiation
corresponds to the (overt or covert) identity relation of natural languages, i.e., the basis of DE-constructions is an identity relation.

The adverbials are obligatory iff the intentional entity is introduced by them. Syntactically, they are surface adjuncts originating inside the internal argument.

1 I would like to thank Katalin É. Kiss, Ágnes Bende-Farkas and Mártɑ Maleczki and Barbara Ürőgdi for discussions and comments on this paper. And special thanks are due to Barbara Ürőgdi for helping me to improve the English of this chapter.

2 The judgments vary from speaker to speaker, examples (1-4) reflect my own idiolect, but all speakers will find similar constructions which require the adverbial for the non-specific reading of the DP.

3 List contexts (Rando and Napoli 1978), reminder contexts (Lakoff 1987; Lumsden 1988; Ward and Birner 1995), and presentative superlatives (Holmback 1984) are the typical examples. List readings are exemplified by B’s answer in (i), reminder readings are used in cases where A reminds B of an already acknowledged reason for not doing X, one that A seems to have momentarily forgotten, and A responds, “Well, yes, there’s always that”, and an example of presentative superlatives is shown in (ii).

(i) A: How do I get to UCLA from here?
   B: well there’s always the bus, but it doesn’t run very often.

(ii) Wow! There’s the biggest dog I’ve ever seen in the yard!

4 The use of the notion of information structure will not be restricted in this chapter to the functions of topic and focus, and will not be understood either as a structural or as a pragmatic notion but extends to all syntactic, semantic and pragmatic phenomena that contribute to information organization in general. For example, the matter of introducing persistent discourse referent into the discourse (i.e., presentation) is also involved and, as I will argue, this has a semantic basis.

5 A clause is neutral if it contains no focus-moved constituent and no negation – see Chapter 2 of this volume.

6 In contrast, pure non-specifics appearing in intensional contexts, e.g. (i), or in experiential aspect, e.g. (ii), cannot serve as antecedents of ensuing anaphora, which is exemplified by the (b) examples.

(i) a. Ígértem egy biciklit k Marinak.
    b. #Ma azzal k ment iskolába.
    ‘I promised a bicycle to Mary’
    Today she rode it to school.
    b. #Nagyon tetszettek Øk.
    ‘I have already watched two films a day.’
    ‘I liked them very much.’

7 I will refer to DE-constructions containing definite DPs as the deictic type, following Lambrecht’s (1994) terminology, although strictly speaking the DP does not have to be deictic but may refer to uniquely identifiable entities as well.
According to Keenan (2003), a determiner is strong iff non-intersective. A determiner $D$ is intersective iff for all $A, A', B$ and $B'$ subsets of the domain $E$: if $A \cap B = A' \cap B'$ then $D(A,B) = D(A',B')$.

For example, Szabolcsi (1992) gives the following context for the use of the tautological sentence *Van a ló* ‘There is the horse’:

(i) Most, hogy az autót ellopták, nem tudom, hogyan szállítsuk a gyümölcsöt. – Hát, van a ló.
   ‘Now that our car has been stolen, I don’t know how to carry the fruit. – Well, there is the horse.’

An example for this type is the following:

(i) *Telefonált János.*

  phoned John

  ‘John has phoned.’

I have to mention that the connection of presentation and theticity, which is maintained by Lambrecht (1994) and others, only holds in the above case but not in the case of DP presentation, which is examined in this chapter.

It follows from what has been said so far that DE-constructions are the only means of presenting a DP. At the same time, one can construe contexts where non-DE-constructions seem to introduce a discourse referent. In spite of the generally observed specificity effect (É Kiss 1995, Kálmán 1995), i.e. that the particle verb counterparts of DE-verbs (like *meg-érkezik* ‘PRT-arrive’ in (i)) normally require a specific internal argument, the DP seems to be presented in (i). It is worth noting, however, that two types of presentation – a semantically based one and a pragmatically based one – can be distinguished. The former is the subject of this chapter, while the latter covers cases of accommodation, e.g. (i). The sentence containing a particle verb triggers anaphoric presupposition (Bende-Farkas 2002b) which can be accommodated even if the discourse referent, in reality, is new. In contrast, a case of semantically based presentation does not presuppose the existence of the presented referent.

(i) *Meg-érkezett egy vonat.*

  PRT-arrived a train

  ‘A train arrived.’

It is interesting that Enç does not fail to note (Enç 1991: fn. 18) that her functional analysis of existential sentences is offered not as a substitute for a grammatical explanation but rather as a possible explanation for why grammars have evolved so as to restrict existential sentences in this way.

In syntax, I will refer to this position as spec,PredP following É. Kiss (2002).

It is worth noting that conjunctivism is similar to the Minimalist approach in syntax in that both attempt to uncover the true structure of language by characterizing it within remarkably weak formal systems.

This remark calls our attention to pragmatic accommodation effects.

These uses of deictic expressions in presentational sentences in Hungarian are different from the so-called ‘indefinite this’ in English (Lambrecht 1994:83):

(i) *I met this guy from Heidelberg on the train.*
In English, the speaker signals his intention to add further information about the person in question by using *this*, while the referent is a not-yet-identifiable person. In contrast, the referents of Hungarian non-specific definites have to be identifiable also by the addressee, although discourse externally.

17 Necessarily quantificational DPs are unacceptable in DE-constructions unless they quantify over properties (McNally 1998), cf. (i) and (ii).

(i) *There was every doctor at the convention.*

(ii) *There was every kind of doctor at the convention.*

These expressions carry existential presupposition, hence cannot be non-specific, and cannot occur in DE-constructions, in contrast to some definites. The acceptability of (ii) is due to the fact that onlys the existence of the kinds but not the existence of individuals of that kind is presupposed.

18 A small clause analysis is also possible in the case of (29b), I will turn back to it in subsection 5.4 in passing. However, the contrast in the availability of discourse referents yields an argument against the parallel analyses of (29a) and (29b).

19 In English there is no difference between (32a) and (32d), or between (33a) and (33d), as bare NPs cannot be predicational.

20 The famous example of an identity statement ‘The Morning Star is (identical to) the Evening Star’ suggests that not only an intentional entity and its instance but also two intentional entities may be identical. However, this case has no importance in the description of presentational constructions.

21 Russell (1919) has this to say about the difference between bare NPs and indefinites. “The proposition *Socrates is a man* is no doubt ‘equivalent’ to *Socrates is human*, but it is not the very same proposition. The is of *Socrates is human* expresses the relation of subject and predicate; the is of *Socrates is a man* expresses identity.” (Russell 1919: 172, cited by Kádár 2006) In my view, it is not the verb be but the presence or absence of discourse referents and their informational status (given or new) that is burdened with these meanings.

22 More precisely, it is circumstantial adverbials that are under discussion here. The mechanism of predicate adverbiaonal and sentential adverbial placement is accounted for, e.g., by É. Kiss (Chapter 1); there, adjunct status is reflected by syntactic adjunction in accordance with Ernst’s (2002) semantically motivated theory and in contrast to Cinque’s (1999) hierarchy according to which these adverbials would occupy specifier positions.

23 This fact obviously leads to the question whether complex event structure is indeed encoded by the verb or comes into being first in the sentence. In chapter 10, Kiefer argues for the former view, while this chapter is written in the spirit of the latter one. A thorough discussion of this matter, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter.

24 Structural case (subject, object, indirect object) is determined by the syntactic position of the argument. Lexical case is prescribed in the lexical entry of the predicate, and, as a consequence, the corresponding case morpheme is just a form designating a constituent for a certain thematic role without contributing to the meaning on its own. Thematic case is associated with particular thematic roles.
The locative accompanying *live*-type verbs, and thematic arguments in general, are problematic for tests 2 and 3, i.e., they behave as adjuncts. Their argumenthood, which is widely held, is based on semantic selection and obligatoriness. It is argued in this chapter that in the case of adverbials licensing DE, obligatoriness does not test argumenthood. As the matter of locative arguments is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, I only refer to the possibility of analysing the locatives of *live*-type verbs on a par with the adverbials under scrutiny here.

In Hungarian it is hard to find a good candidate for extraction from noun phrases. PP complements, are problematic as they cannot appear inside the NP since they would intervene between the case affix and the hosting noun head. Thus, there is no direct evidence for the complement status of such PPs, but the contrast shown in example (38) provides indirect evidence by showing that the PP does not behave like a high adverbial but like an extraposed one.

The dative case marked possessor is typically used for testing but it is also problematic. Ürögdi (2003), on the basis of extracted possessors, concludes that the associates of verbal particles, e.g. goals, are arguments, see (ia), while other goals are adjuncts and form an island for movement, see (ib). If one uses a complement PP in the test, it turns out that all goals, even the associates of verbal particles, are adjuncts, (iia-b) vs. (iic).

(i) a. *Kinek* írtad rá a verset a t sírkővére?
   'On whose gravestone did you write the poem?'
   b. *Kinek* írtad meg a verset a t sírkővére?
   'For whose gravestone did you write the poem?'

(ii) a. *Melyik országról* írtad rá a nevedet a könyvre?
    'About which country did you write your name on the book?'
   b. *Melyik országról* írtad meg a bevezetőt a könyvbe?
    'About which country did you write the introduction to the book?'
   c. *Melyik országról* írtad meg a könyve?
    'About which country did you write the book?'

State adverbials constitute a broader class than depictives. Depictives are state adverbials where the described state and the main event of the sentence overlap in time.

On a discussion of Hungarian case suffixes and Ps, see Kádár (Chapter 7 this volume).
The adverbials studied in this chapter do not seem to be complements of the NP as they are not selected by the N. But at the same time, keeping in mind the idea that the adverbial is the restrictor of the domain of the NP, suggested in 2.3.2 for the case of the coda of English *there*-constructions, the contribution of the meaning of the adverbial to the meaning of the NP is still essential.