Analogy in Inflection

Workshop to be held in conjunction with the 20th International Morphology Meeting

Abstract Submission:

We invite anonymous 1 page abstracts (+1 page for references/figures) for 20 minute presentations (plus 10 minutes for discussion). Submission of the same abstract to both the workshop and the IMM20 main session is not permitted.

Original Abstract submission deadline: 15 January 2022

New Abstract submission deadline: 31 January 2022

EasyChair Submission Link: https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=imm20analogyininflec

Acceptance Notifications: 31 May 2022 (for all sessions of IMM20)

IMM20 submissions are limited to one individual and one joint abstract (or two joint ones) per person. For additional information on abstract submission, check the IMM20 website: http://www.nytud.hu/imm20/.

Organisers:

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Analogy is invoked to account for a wide-range of synchronic and diachronic phenomena, yet is still only partially understood. This is true whether analogy is approached as a language-specific capacity for producing meaningful novel forms based on perceived patterns, or as a domain-general cognitive ability for reasoning about relationships between elements based on prior knowledge (Fertig 2013:12).

Work on analogy to date encompasses many theoretical disagreements. Some issues are overtly stated, including: Is analogy as a type of change (Sturtevant 1917; Lehmann 1962) or does it underlie all productive language use (Saussure 1916:179,226-8; Meillet 1908:47; Jesperson 1922, Bloomfield 1933:275-7)? Is language transmission the locus of change (Paul 1886, Halle 1962:64-5, King 1969:78, Kiparsky 1965, Aitchison 2001:201-2; Janda 2001), or has this been overemphasised (Bolinger 1968:93,104; Haspelmath 1998; Bybee 2009)? Is paradigm levelling an extension of a non-alternating pattern (Garrett 2008:142; Hill 2007, Albright 2005; Sturtevant 1917) or is it a bias preferring non-alternating stems (Kenstowicz 1996, Kiparsky 1971,Kiparsky 1992, Jeffers & Lehiste 1979, McCarthy 2005 ), somewhere in the middle (Osthoff 1879:42-4; Wheeler 1887:31; Bybee 1980; Hock 1986:179-82; Fertig 1999; Reiss 2006), or is the distinction between the two epiphenomenal (Garrett 2008, Sims-Williams 2016, Hill 2020)?

However, less attention has been paid to clarifying the implicit assumptions in much of this work. This workshop intends to bring together researchers to spell out assumptions often implicit in our
investigations of analogy within inflectional paradigms. Contributions might address, but are not limited to, the following questions:

- What models of morphology, phonology, morphosyntax and semantics are assumed in analogy research - item & arrangement vs word and paradigm, dynamic vs static models, rule vs exemplar based? To what extent do changes in these assumptions affect the viability of the account, and to what extent does the account survive across multiple assumptions?
- Does analogy require ‘innate’ or domain-specific linguistic knowledge and abilities, or does it reflect acquired or domain general skills? If both, then in what mix?
- What evidence does the individual have access to in order to ‘do’ analogy – what parts of the lexicon, which aspects of forms and meanings, and in what quantities? On what basis does this evidence come available? Do speakers use only positive evidence of similarity, or is negative evidence of dissimilarity also used (Round, Beniamine & Esher 2021)?
- Do speakers of all languages employ the same inferential processes, or might they hone them in some way to suit the language? Can this help overcome the problem of computational intractability that analogy might appear to present (Skousen 2002)?
- Do all speakers of the same language employ the same inferential processes? If there is variation, what are its parameters and limits?
- What processes are considered under the heading of analogy? Are both so-called proportional and non-proportional processes considered? Do these employ the same inferential processes or different ones?
- What evidence is needed to identify historical cases of analogical innovation? Andersen (1980) notes when data is temporally fine-grained, a different picture may emerge than from just knowing initial and final states. Fertig (2013:80) notes that putative examples of regularisation can lack historical evidence, relying instead upon the circular logic, that since regularisation is more common than irregularisation, if both irregular and regular forms are found in related languages, then the irregular must be the original and the regular must be a result of analogy.
- Given the predominantly Indo-European evidence basis for many theories of analogy, can we accurately account for patterns found in non-Indo-European languages?

References


